No Work for a Theory of Grounding. 15Work by Audi (2012), Fine (2012), Koslicki (2013), Raven (2012), Rosen (2010), Schaffer (2009), and Wilson (2014) provide some early discussions of grounding and inspired debate concerning the existence and nature of ground. 1989. Although inhabitants of w might call XYZ by a word which is homonymous with our word ‘water,’ XYZ is not water, and our concept WATER doesn’t apply to it (Putnam 1973, 1975; Burge 1986). These two philosophical discussions have opposing opinions on how different annotations generated in science are practical to the world. ” Realism has been chiefly concerned with the commonplaces of everyday life among the middle and lower classes, where character is a product of social factors and environment is the integral element in the dramatic complications. DOI:, Khalidi, MA. You’re looking at a computer screen. DOI: In section 3, I consider two ways of analyzing the way in which social kinds are supposed to depend on our mental states: a modal-existential relation and a ground-theoretic relation. However, accomplishing the Dependence Task does not thereby accomplish the Anti-Realist Task. Social Ontology and the Philosophy of Society. Literary realism is a literary genre, part of the broader realism in arts, that attempts to represent subject-matter truthfully, avoiding speculative fiction and supernatural elements.It originated with the realist art movement that began with mid-nineteenth-century French literature (), and Russian literature (Alexander Pushkin). Definition of anti-realism. DOI:, Epstein, B. In other words, MD2 does not accomplish the Dependence Task. The arguments in this paper provide further reasons to support Khalidi’s conclusion. Although I agree that social kinds depend on our conventions in some way, I do not think that MD2 correctly identifies the sense in which social kinds are conventional. DOI:, Epstein, B. DOI:, Cooper, R. 2004. First, when evaluating modal claims we sometimes hold our linguistic and conceptual conventions fixed and consider possible worlds that differ from the actual world with respect to which properties are instantiated. 21–64. 97–122. In: Zahle, J and Collin, F (eds. Burge, T. 1979. 351–383. In that case, social kind anti-realists may have reached the right conclusion for the wrong reasons—their argument is invalid. On the Nature of Social Kinds. No scientist has ever seen a black hole, but theory predicts that they exist. Realism in literature was a movement which started in Germany. For example, MD2 says that it is conventional that money is a commonly used medium of exchange and measure and store of value. But social kinds may be unreal (in some sense) for different reasons. Munich: Philosophia Verlag. DOI: DOI:, Putnam, H. 1973. A kind, K, is water only if K is H2O.23 In other words, water is necessarily H2O. However, she maintains that ‘a more robust realism is…often thought to require that there be a world that not only exists, but also has a certain structure independently of the mental’ (2003b: 582). 53–68. Every kind that exists has an identity (i.e., a nature), and the essential properties of a kind are just those properties that identify the kind in question. The essential properties of an individual are what it is to be that very individual, as opposed to some other individual. Therefore, social kinds are merely a ‘projection’ of our thoughts onto mind-independent reality. Call this the Anti-Realist Task. Anti-realism in the sense that Dummett uses the term is also often called semantic anti-realism. The sentences and ideas are in your mind (and mine, as I write them), but the computer, the server, the pixels, and your eyeballs are all real objects in the real world.This is the position of philosophical realism: the view that whatever we perceive is real, truly out there. As such, it does not support social kind anti-realism. Anti-realism is defined in opposition to realism, and so it is natural to ask first what realism is and to arrive at a characterization of anti-realism on this basis. Realism, as a literary style, works in tandem with technological developments progressing alongside it. Interestingly, quantum physicists believe that the Large Hadron Collider will create micro-black holes, so the boundary between realism a… There is some world, w′ = , such that the properties which are essential to money in the actual world, w@, are not essential to money in w′. It’s not … According to social kind anti-realism, social kinds (e.g., money) exist but their ontological status is diminished in some way. A Framework for Social Ontology. Lenham: Roman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. pp. The Essence of Response-Dependence. Literary realism attempts to represent familiar things as they are. ), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter). Social Construction and Grounding. 17–38. Why Hacking is Wrong about Human Kinds. Of course, proceeding with a merely figurative characterization of the sense of unreality social kind anti-realists attribute to social kinds is unsatisfying. As such, neither MD1 nor MD1-G supports social kind anti-realism. It does not matter whether the relevant mental states are about the kinds, their instances, both or neither. Realism in literature is an approach that attempts to describe life without idealization or romantic subjectivity. Objectivity and Modern Idealism: What is the question? Social Ontology and Political Power. Metaphysical Dependence: Grounding and Reduction. In other words, magical realism can be defined as stories rooted in reality—with a touch of, well, magic. In: Schmitt, FF (ed. For a brief discussion comparing such anti-realism to its opposite, realism, see (Okasha 2002, ch. My argument in this section will parallel the argument given in the previous one: for any kind, K, if being F is essential to being K, then, K is necessarily F. If K is necessarily F, then it is not in our power to determine whether K is F—a fortiori it is not in our power to determine whether K is F by the way in which we use our words and concepts. A conventionalist about C says that ‘the way things stand C-wise’ is conventional, and that if our conventions had differed, then ‘the way things stand C-wise’ would have differed as well (2006: 459). Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 72(1): 97–119. DOI:, Johnston, M. 1989. 2006. Tuomela, R. 2007. DOI: Philosophy of Science, 67(3): 628–639. MD2 expresses a conventionalist view of social kinds. According to MD2, the essential properties of social kinds depend on our conventions—in particular, they depend on our linguistic or conceptual conventions. Varieties of Ontological Dependence. They argue that many social kinds (e.g., recessions, racism) do not depend on our having mental states that are about the kinds in question. DOI:, Epstein, B. Therefore, the essential properties of social kinds are not determined by linguistic or conceptual conventions. Ontological Dependence. Some of the relations I consider are explicitly defended in the social ontology literature. Those are very quick takes on the two views and should not be satisfactory in and of themselves to anyone. Thus, in what follows I consider only non-causal relations of mind-dependence. Realism revolted against the exotic subject matter and exaggerated emotionalism and drama typical of the Romantic movement. ), Institutions, Emotions, and Group Agents: Contributions to Social Ontology. Thus, even if MD3 accomplishes the Dependence Task, it does not accomplish the Anti-Realist Task. Philosophers use the word ‘real’ to mark a wide variety of distinctions. However, Ásta also notes that her view differs from conventionalism in important ways (144–147). In the actual world, w@, we have the concept MONEY1, which refers to K1. In Hoeltje, M, Schnieder, B and Steinberg, A (eds. The Realism vs. Anti-Realism Debate The mid-1980's saw a transformation of the debate over "scientific rationality" which had been unleashed by Kuhn's perceived challenge to the traditional claim that scientific belief is determined by evidence and reasoning. The case against MD1 is quite simple: two entities can be modally correlated without one being dependent on the other (Fine 1995). Natural Categories and Human Kinds. DOI:, Khalidi, MA. The author has no competing interests to declare. Lanham: Roman & Littlefield Publishing, Inc. pp. Rather, some other property, say, the property of being yellow, is essential to being money. For example, it is not the case that racism and recessions exist only if we have thoughts about racism and recessions. 17Those who reject the idea that grounding holds between facts, or those who believe that grounding claims ought to be expressed using a sentential operator, are invited to reformulate MD1-G accordingly. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Three Kinds of Social Kinds. In the absence of such an explanation, there is no reason to endorse social kind anti-realism. 23Admittedly, this conclusion is controversial. Wedgwood, R. 1997. The Philosophy of Sociality: The Shared Point of View. DOI: In the preceding sections, I considered two prominent ways of analyzing the relation that is supposed to obtain between social kinds and our mental states. The responses to this question took two broad forms. — … 24Charles Mills defends a similar view with respect to race. Second, in the idiom of grounding, social kind anti-realism is the thesis that social kinds are not real because they are grounded in our mental states. Anti-realistic theatre is any form of theatre which rejects realism. Realism is not a monolithic doctrine. Ian Hacking (1999, p. Anti-realism is the view that the world is mind-dependent, and so derives many, perhaps all, of its features because of how it is perceived. The view that social kinds (e.g., money, migrant, marriage) are mind-dependent is a prominent one in the social ontology literature. Most often, the sense of reality that social kinds are supposed to lack is characterized figuratively. According to him, the scientific knowledge has to be at least in principle, if principle or theory is refutable and the logic behind no matter how large is empirical evidence, scientist does not attempt to prove or make their theory plausible by means of observations and experiments. Bliss, R and Trogdon, K. 2016. Especially in its second half many neo-realist movements were launched, and non-Western literatures (e.g. Mallon, R. 2016. In philosophy of science, anti-realism applies chiefly to claims about the non-reality of "unobservable" entities such as electrons or genes, which are not detectable with human senses. For example, Amie Thomasson (2003b) distinguishes between social kinds that are “epistemically opaque” (e.g., racism, recessions) and those that are not (e.g., money). Philosophy Compass, 10(5): 322–333. 14Thanks to an anonymous referee for this suggestion. ), Varieties of Dependence: Ontological Dependence, Grounding, Supervenience, Response-Dependence. In: Gallotti, M and Michael, J (eds. On What Grounds What. In this section, I argue that social kind anti-realists have failed to do so. Call this view social kind anti-realism. Given this two-dimensional framework, MD2 can be understood as follows. Philosophical Studies, 140: 135–148. Oxford University Press. With respect to each relation, I argue that either it fails to accomplish the Dependence Task, or it fails to accomplish the Anti-Realist Task. Rather, they maintain that physical, chemical, biological, and even psychological kinds are real, but deny that social kinds have the same status. DOI:, Fine, K. 1994. In fact, Dummett's writings on anti-realism can be seen as an attempt to integrate central ideas from the Philosophical Investigations into analytical philosophy. According to proponents of social kind anti-realism, it is true, for example, that bills issued by the Bureau of Engraving and Printing are money, and it is false that blue gym socks are money. DOI:, Thomasson, A. “Against Social Kind Anti-realism”. Secondary Qualities and Self-Location. I follow Sally Haslanger and Ron Mallon in thinking that discursively constructed kinds (i.e., kinds subject to what Ian Hacking (1996) calls ‘looping effects’) are causally mind-dependent in this sense (see Cooper 2004, Khalidi 2010, 2013, 2016; and Mallon 2003, 2016 for germane discussions of discursively constructed or ‘interactive’ kinds). Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 40(2): 244–264. Likewise, to say that the property of being a woman is response-dependent is to say that being a woman is the property of being disposed (under the relevant conditions) to produce the perception (in the relevant subjects) that some individual is a woman. However, it does not follow that my belief that Sacramento is the capital of California is not real.18 Thus, revising the collective acceptance view by appeal to the notion of ground does not support social kind anti-realism. Thus, MD2 does not identify the way in which social kinds depend on our mental states. Thus, even if conferred-properties are response-dependent, this does not provide us with any reason to doubt the reality of conferred properties or the corresponding kinds. Foundations for a Social Ontology. The fact that social kind anti-realists have not identified the sense of unreality that they attribute to social kinds gives us a preliminary reason to doubt that social kind anti-realism is well-founded. Moreover, which objects are money is also a matter of social convention. For ease of exposition, I will treat grounding as a relational predicate, and I will take the relata of the grounding relation to be facts: (MD1-G) A kind, K, is mind-dependent =df The fact that an entity, x, is K is grounded in the fact that we collectively accept that some conditions, c1…cn, suffice for being K.17. Wright, C. 1992. I maintain that essentiality is conferred by our use of concepts’ (138). Metaphysical Grounding. Pettit, P. 1991. Schaffer, J. 58–75. ), Metaphysical Grounding Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 17–26. In the actual world, when c@ is applied to s@, the properties of being a commonly used medium of exchange is essential to money. Other articles where Antirealism is discussed: philosophy of religion: Realism and antirealism: A renewed concern of philosophers of religion in the late 20th and early 21st centuries was to determine the sense in which religious claims may be said to be true. pp. In: Mills, C (ed. Given this, it is especially important for proponents of social kind anti-realism to clearly state the sense in which they claim that social kinds are not real. That is, it does not matter whether the relevant mental states are acceptances, beliefs or something else. On her view, social kinds do not have their boundaries independently of our beliefs about where those boundaries are located because our mental states ‘play a stipulative role in constituting’ their nature (2003b: 590). DOI:, Guala, F. 2010. DOI:, Griffith, AM. Ontological Individualism vs. Anchor Individualism. On Ásta’s view, if those with standing (e.g., social influence or power) in C perceive that S has the property of identifying as a woman, then the property of being a woman is conferred on S in C. If some social kinds are conferred property kinds, then MD3 accomplishes the Dependence Task. ), Rethinking the Individualism-Holism Debate. The essence of X is what X is, or what it is to be X. Essences come in two varieties: individual and general. The interest in Realism led to a movement called Naturalism. 2013. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 63(1): 139–174. What we can do is point to the unclarity in a forthright way, earnestly try to clarify it, and, if that fails (as I have argued that it does), criticize social kind anti-realism in such a way that the unclarity does not need to be resolved in order to see why the view does not support even the figurative claims of unreality. Literary realism most often refers to the trend, beginning with certain works of nineteenth- century French literature and extending to late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century authors in various countries, towards depictions of contemporary life and society "as they were." Anti-realism in science. Ground. First, Searle’s defense of social kind anti-realism includes all social kinds, and not just a subset of them. Does it accomplish the Anti-Realist Task as well? Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 46(2): 147–167. pp. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: pp. (Forthcoming) Social Objects, Response-Dependence, and Realism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 97(2): 393–409. Moreover, social conventions may change in the future such that there ceases to be any permanent residents. By contrast, Fine’s claim, applied to social kinds, is that social kinds are not real because they are grounded, i.e., non-fundamental. Understood in this way, MD2 promises to substantiate the anti-realist’s idea that social kinds are merely a ‘projection’ of our thoughts onto mind-independent reality. The substratum, s, of a world, w, includes those properties which do not depend (in the relevant sense) on the way in which we apply our concepts. As such, it does not support social kind anti-realism. London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson. In other words, even if MD3 accomplishes the Dependence Task, it does not accomplish the Anti-Realist Task. 2014. The essential properties of a kind, K, specify what it is to be that kind, as opposed to some other kind, K*. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 55(1): 73–85. Indeed, according to Searle, mere causal mind-dependence does not justify the claim that social kinds are not real (Searle 1995, 156). DOI:, Mason, R. (2020). The metasemantic thesis is true but uninteresting, and the metaphysical claim is false (for the reasons outlined above). Kinds defined in terms of conferred properties (i.e., conferred property kinds) are mind-dependent in the following sense: (MD3) A kind, K, is mind-dependent =df Being F is a conferred property and being F is essential to being K. According to MD3, a kind, K, is mind-dependent when at least one of its essential properties is a conferred property. But those who defend social kind anti-realism do not argue that social entities are non-existent.8 Rather, social kind anti-realists are what Gideon Rosen call ‘modern idealists’—that is, anti-realists who admit that the allegedly unreal entities in question exist (Rosen 1994: 289). Thus, whether anything is money depends on there being certain social conventions. I am very sympathetic with this claim. 26Many discussions of response-dependence concern response-dependent concepts, see Johnston (1989), Pettit (1991), Wedgwood (1997), and Wright (1992). Metaphysics, 3(1), 55–67. 27This conclusion is compatible with its being the case that social kinds are not real for a different reason (e.g., because grounded entities are not real). Thus, K1 and K2 are different kinds that have different essential properties, not the same kind with different essential properties. Dordrecht: Springer. Mason, R., 2020. Astá defends the thesis that the property of being a man and the property of being a woman are conferred properties (Ásta 2013, 2018). Philosophical Studies, 174(10): 2449–2465. DOI:, Searle, J. DOI:, Egan, A. Instead, proponents of social kind anti-realism argue that the relation that obtains between social kinds and our mental states (the Dependence Task), and which undermines their reality (the Anti-Realist Task), is a non-causal relation of some kind. Mills argues that individuals acquire the property of being black or being white in virtue of the fact that we intersubjectively judge them to be black or white (Mills 1998). On this view, entities are real only if they are metaphysically fundamental (Fine 2001). For example, to say that the property of being red is response-dependent is to say that redness is the property of being disposed to produce reddish sensations in us under certain conditions. Social Construction: Big-G Grounding, Small-g Realization. 2008. 1An anonymous referee suggests that there may be different kinds of social kinds, and that they may depend on our mental states in a diversity of ways. In this section, I want to reconsider MD2 by appeal to a framework devised by Iris Einheuser to defend what she calls ‘conventionalism,’ the view that ‘some aspects of reality depend on our conventions’ (2006: 460). But the existence of d does not depend on the set which contains d alone—to the contrary, the existence of the set depends on the existence of the dollar bill (Fine 1995). 2018a. DOI:, Khalidi, MA. Schaffer, J. In: Sperber, D, Premack, D and Premack, AJ (eds. In: Zalta, EN (ed. 3In particular, Thomasson argues that institutional social kinds (e.g., money) are not real because of the way in which they depend on our mental states. 1995. Ontological Dependence: An Opinionated Survey. The Facts of the Social Sciences. The idea that response-dependent properties like being red do not have the same metaphysical status as response-independent properties like being hexagonal is a tempting one. Ruben, DH. That is, they must identify a dependence relation that obtains between social kinds and our mental states. Social Construction, Social Roles, and Stability. My arguments are directed at the more general claim that social kinds simpliciter are unreal for two reasons. »magic realism«) challenged Western modernity and its constructivist epistemology. 2016. As such, the proposed analysis of mind-dependence likewise fails to accomplish the Dependence Task. is money. Modernist literature and art have been dominated by a disinterest in mere empirical and social reality and a discontent with habitualized perception and the world-view of convention, reason, and pragmatism. In this section, I consider an alternative relation of mind-dependence drawn from Ásta’s work on the metaphysics of social properties (2008, 2013, 2018). In: Konzelmann Ziv, A and Schmid, HB (eds. 2016 for germane discussions of discursively constructed or ‘interactive’ kinds,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,